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CASE COMMENTS
TORTS-TORT FEASOR IS NOT ABSOLVED BECAUSE
THE ONE INJURED WAS VIOLATING A PENAL LAW-
Every now and then the members of as reputedly "dry" a pro-
fession as the legal fraternity have something to smile about. Such
a momentary lapse from the air of stiff austerity (assumed or
otherwise) that the law throws about itself is offered by a cursory
glance at the opinion of our High Court in Harris v. Iacovetto
(----Colo .-...... 1952-53 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4, p. 53).
Rex Harris was an employee of Sam Iacovetto, who was an
ardent pursuer of the fruits of his fellow men's weakness for
the unpredictable awards of the age old sporting devices, cards
and dice. In short, Sam ran a gambling table, and Rex was one
of his operators. The tactical headquarters for the enterprise was
Artesia, Colorado. The scene of operations was a bar in Vernal,
Utah.
The suit arose out of an automobile accident occurring be-
tween Artesia and Vernal as the two parties were returning home
after an evening's work at the mutually satisfying venture. The
employer was driving when the car suddenly went out of control
and eventually lodged on its side against a fence next to the high-
way after turning over.
Harris brought suit in the district court of Moffat County,
basing his claim to damages on lacovetto's simple negligence. The
plaintiff attempted to avoid the burden of proving intent to harm
or wilful and wanton misconduct on" the part of the defendant
as our guest statute requires 1 by alleging that he was a passenger
for hire.
Defendant moved for a dismissal at the conclusion of plain-
tiff's case on the theory that plaintiff was a guest, or, if not a
guest, then a passenger for hire who was barred from recovering
because the employment was pursuant to an illegal contract for
gambling. The trial court thereupon granted the motion and dis-
missed the case, the reason seeming to be that if plaintiff was in
fact a passenger for hire, then the relationship was based on an
illegal enterprise and plaintiff would consequently be precluded
from recovering.
The trial court was reversed upon appeal, something which
should have come as no great shock to most.
The defense interposed by the defendant, and the trial court's
ruling thereon illustrate the facility with which tort law can be
confused with contract law by some. The law of negligence is
predicated upon the theory that some act, or the failure to act
when such action is the duty imposed by law, must contribute
''95 C. S. A., c. 16, see. 371.
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proximately to the invasion of an interest of another before the
actor will be answerable. Inherent in this is the fundamental
principle that the injured person's claim for damages will not
survive if his own actions (or inactions) are the proximate cause
of his injuries. Hence the doctrines of contributory negligence
and last clear chance arise. To prevent a party from recovering
for injuries based upon the negligence of another solely because
he was indulging in an illegal act at the time without regard as
to whether such illegal undertaking contributed proximately to
his injuries is to disregard completely numerous authorities.
2
189, 258 P. 1094; City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 33 P. 685; Arnold
v. Owens, 78 F. 2d 495; 38 Am. Jur., sec. 213, p. 899.
It would be inconceivable that our Supreme Court could have
held otherwise than it did when it stated (p. 54) :
Plaintiff should not be denied relief if the illegal
factor contended for by the defendant, and sustained by
the court, had no causal connection with the injury of
which complaint is made.
The sometimes arbitrary maxims of "public policy" can be-
come a dangerous impediment to the cause of justice in the hands
of well-meaning but unforseeing courts. Let's keep such maxims
out of the law of proximate cause unless better reasons than the
ones entertained in this case are found.
KENNETH R. WHITING.
2 Martin v. Carruthers, 69 Colo. 464, 195 P. 105; Arps v. Denver, 82 Colo.
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Eighty Years Of Service
Four score years ago, in 1873, Shepard's hung up its
shingle and began furnishing the legal profession
with a case citation service limited in scope and
cumbersome in form.
Today, eighty years later, Shepard's publishes a com-
prehensive citation service in compact form covering
every state and federal jurisdiction from coast to
coast and embracing all types of citations-to cases,
to constitutions, to statutes, and to other reposi-
tories of law. The little 1873 group of initial pur-
chasers has grown to thousands upon thousands of
members of the Bench and Bar to whom SHEPARD'S
CITATIONS has by their. own acknowledgment be-
come an "indispensable service."
On this occasion of the eightieth anniversary of its
founding, Shepard's looks with confidence and faith
to the future and continues firm and resolute in its
determination ever to be of the greatest possible
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